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COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDITOR'S NoTL-It is intended in each issue of DICTA to print brief abstracts of
the decisions of the Supreme Court These abstracts will be printed only after the
time within which a petition for rehearing may be filed has elapsed without such ac-
tion being taken, or in the event that a petition for rehearing has been filed the abstract
will be printed only after the petition has been disposed of.)
APPEAL AND ERROR-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE-No. 12471
-Cherokee Realty Company vs. Allen-Decided Decem-
ber 9, 1929.
Facts.-Allen had judgment against defendant for serv-
ices rendered in effectuating the exchange of real estate be-
longing to plaintiff below. The plaintiff alleged that the com-
pensation was to be paid in cash while the defendant alleged
another method of payment.
Held.-The evidence upon the only question in dispute
was in sharp conflict; there was competent evidence before
the Court upon which to base his judgment, and under the
well established and oft announced decisions of this Court,
we are not at liberty to disturb it.
Judgment Affirmed.
ATTORNEYS - DISBARMENT - People vs. Lindsey - No.
12130-Decided December 9, 1929.
Facts.-Lindsey, while Juvenile Judge and also while
still holding a license as attorney at law, accepted $37,500
from Mrs. Stokes and $10,000 from Samuel Untermyer, New
York attorney, as the result of a contest instituted by Mrs.
Stokes as guardian of her two minor children to set aside the
will of their father in the State of New York. The contest re-
sulted in a settlement whereby certain shares of stock were
secured of great value. Proceedings with reference to the
guardianship of the persons of these minors were at that time
pending in the Juvenile Court, without having been finally
closed. With the knowledge of the Juvenile Judge and at his
instigation, proceedings were had in the County Court of
Denver to have Mrs. Stokes appointed as guardian of the
estate of said minors, a petition was filed therein stating that
there was not sufficient cash in the estate and it was necessary
to borrow money on the stock belonging to the minors in order
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to pay certain local parties for services. An order was entered
granting such permission. The certain local parties was the
respondent, Lindsey. The respondent claimed first that the
$37,500 and the $10,000 were a gift and were not for services
as an attorney; and second that the contest over the Will, being
in the State of New York, had no reference to any legal serv-
ices or litigation in the State of Colorado over which this
Court would have jurisdiction.
Held.-Lindsey rendered legal services and not mere
services of a friend, mediator, or arbitrator. The money was
paid.to him for legal services and not as a gift. An essential
element of a gift is an intention of the donor to bestow some-
thing on the donee voluntarily and without any consideration
whatever. In the instant case, Lindsey gave a receipt in full
for the moneys received by him. Gifts are exempt from the
imposition of any income tax under the laws of the United
States, yet the respondent, in his income tax, returned the
amount received as income received. Respondent was false to
his oath taken as a judicial officer, and also false to his oath as
an attorney and counselor at law, and has proven himself un-
worthy of the trust imposed in him by this Court.
Judgment entered that respondent be removed from the
office of attorney and counselor at law and his license revoked.
AUTOMOBILES - LAST CLEAR CHANCE - PLEADING - No.
12182-Bragdon vs. Hexter-Decided November 12, 1929.
Facts.-Personal injury action by Hexter against Brag-
don. The trial Court introduced into the case for the first
time by its instructions, the Last Clear Chance doctrine. The
same was not pleaded by the plaintiff either in his complaint
or replication. In the answer, the defendant alleged that
plaintiff was guilty of carelessness and negligence. Plaintiff
simply filed general denial.
Held.-When the defendant specifically alleged in the
answer that plaintiff was guilty of negligence that directly
contributed to the accident, and plaintiff filed replication con-
sisting of a denial, plaintiff may not avail herself of the Last
Clear Chance doctrine. If plaintiff desired to avail herself of
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this doctrine, she must affirmatively plead facts showing that
the last clear chance doctrine was applicable.
Judgment Reversed.
BANKS-CHECKS--D EPOSITS-Bro o mfield vs. Cochran-No.
12304-Decided December 9, 1929.
Facts.-Defendants issued a check to Cochran drawn on
the International Trust Company. The check was endorsed
and deposited in defendant's account at the Broadway Na-
tional Bank. The drawee was permitted by the bank to draw
against the check after its deposit. Payment was stopped on
the check and the receiver of the bank brought suit against
the makers to cover the amount paid out by the bank. Judg-
ment for defendant in the Court below.
Held.-Where a check is drawn on one bank and uncon-
ditionally deposited in another, the latter becomes merely an
agent of the depositor and title does not pass to said bank; but
if the bank of deposit extends credit and permits the depositor
to withdraw the amount of the check, the bank becomes the
owner thereof.
Judgment Reversed.
BILLS AND NOTES-BONA FIDE HOLDER-CONSIDERATION.-
No. 11940-Schwalb and Cannon vs. Riel-Decided
November 12, 1929.
Facts.-Plaintiffs sued defendant on two counts to re-
cover on two promissory notes. Defendant interposed two
defenses alleging no consideration, payment, and estoppel.
The Court refused to instruct verdict for plaintiffs.
Held.-The undisputed evidence discloses that a valuable
consideration was paid for the notes and that there was no
payment by set-off, or otherwise, and that the defendants are
not estopped to assert that they are bona fide holders for value
in good faith, and without notice of any infirmity in said notes.




BROKERS' LICENSE-CONTRACTS-No. 12420-Black Forest
Realty & Investment Co. vs. Clarke-Decided November
25, 1929.
Facts.-The Realty Company employed Clarke as its
general sales manager to have supervision of all sales of lots
owned by the Company. Clarke was to receive a salary, plus
five per cent. of the purchase price on sales. He recovered
judgrent below; defense was that he had no real estate brok-
ers' license. This issue was not tendered until day of trial
and Court denied application to amend.
Held.-It was not necessary for Clarke to have a brokers'
license. He was merely an employe of the Company. The
proposed amendment presented no defense, but if it were
otherwise, the delay in applying for leave to amend would
justify the Court in denying the application.
Judgment Afflrmed.
CONTRACTS-TIME NOT ESSENCE OF CONTRACT-Kitt vs.
Runge-No. 12187-Decided December 9, 1929.
Facts.-Parties below entered into a contract to exchange
certain lands, exchange to be made on October 1st, 1'927. Ex-
change could not be completed on the date specified because
there was a mortgage against one of the pieces of land, and
the holder of the mortgage delayed in executing the release
through no fault of the owner of the land. Time was not
specifically mentioned as being of the essence of the contract.
Court below granted specific performance.
Held.-Time is not of the essence of a contract, unless
it is made so, either specifically or by the circumstances of the
case.
Judgment Affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-CONFIDENCE GAME-BILL OF PARTICULARS
-12343-Stewart vs. People-Decided Dec. 2, 1929.
Facts.-Stewart was convicted of an attempt to obtain
money from an insurance company by means of the confidence
game. He filed claim against an insurance company for theft
of two wheels, tires and tubes. Upon investigation the alleged
stolen property was found hidden on his premises. Stewart
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introduced no evidence in defense. He asked for a bill of
particulars.
Held.-It is within sound discretion of the lower court
to grant or deny motion for bill of particulars in a criminal
case. The evidence justified conviction.
Judgment Affirmed.
DEEDS-RESERVATION OF MINERALS-SURFACE RIGHTS--NO.
12203-Whiles vs. The Grand Junction Mining and Fuel
Company-Decided November 12, 1929.
Facts.-Plaintiff Whiles is owner of irrigated lands by
virtue of divers mesne conveyances from the Union Pacific
Railroad Company. The Railroad Company reserved min-
erals and coal underlying the surface. Defendant is lessee of
the Railroad Company of the coal underlying Plaintiff's land.
Action was for injunction to restrain defendant from entering
upon or mining coal.
Held.-Impossible to mine coal in such a way as to leave
sufficient support for the surface. Defendant may not remove
coal unless it furnishes a statutory indemnity bond to protect
tfie plaintiff in surface rights. Defendant restrained until such
bond is furnished although surface owner is not obliged to ask
for a bond, nevertheless, if bond is offered sufficient to protect
the surface owner, the Court may permit further mining
operations by requiring a bond that will cover all damages
that the surface owner may suffer.
Judgment Affirmed.
DIVORCE-ENTRY OF FINAL DECREE-No. 12164-Sarah A.
Tierney vs. M. E. Tierney-Decided October 14, 1929.
Facts.-Plaintiff below (plaintiff in error) brought an
action for divorce and findings of fact and conclusions of law
in her favor were entered. About four months thereafter she
filed a petition asking that the suit be dismissed. Defendant
resisted this petition and thereafter the Court entered a decree
of divorce in favor of plaintiff, but over her protest.
Held-This case is governed by Walton v. Walton, 278
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Pac. 780, which held that a guilty party may not obtain a de-
cree of divorce over the objection of the successful party.
Reversed and Remanded with Instructions.
INJUNCTION - SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-REPLEVIN-LEGAL
AND EQUITABLE RELIEF-No. 12204-Mosco vs. Jeannot-
Decided November 25, 1929.
Facts.-Mosco, through her next friend, brought action
against defendants asking for an injunction, and at the same
time asking for damages and for a body judgment, on the
grounds that defendants were conducting a voting contest
whereby the one receiving the largest number- of votes was to
win an automobile and the plaintiff alleged that she had the
largest number of votes, but that defendants awarded the auto-
mobile to one, Martinez, one of the defendants, contrary to
the rules of the contest. Demurrer to the complaint was sus-
tained below.
Held.-Plaintiff below mistook her remedy. She should
have brought an action in the nature of replevin to recover
her automobile, and if she was entitled to it, it would have
been awarded to her by the Court. The facts pleaded present
no case for injunctive relief, nor for specific performance of
contract.
Judgment Affirmed.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE-No.
12453-Wilkins vs. The People-Decided October 28,1929.
Facts.-The Defendant below was convicted of a second
offence in violation of the intoxicating liquor statute. The
sole question on which defendant relies for reversal of the
judgment is the insufficiency of the evidence.
Held.-There was sufficient evidence to sustain the ver-
dict. The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given
to the testimony was exclusively for the jury, and the jury




Hunter-No. 12272-Decided December 9, 1929.
Facts.-Walker sued Hunter and others for libel on ac-
count of matters contained in a petition to the County Com-
missioners to close a certain dance hall. In the complaint the
plaintiff alleged that the defendants falsely, maliciously, and
with intent to injure and prejudice the plaintiff, published the
libel, and that the same was false and was known by the de-
fendants to be false, and that the defendants were guilty of
malice and wilful deceit in the matter. Court below sustained
a demurrer to the complaint.
Held.-The complaint sufficiently charged express
malice. The demurrer should have been overruled.
Judgment Reversed.
PHYSICIANS-OSTEOPATHY-No. 12237-Newton vs. Board
of County Commissioners-Decided November 25, 1929.
Facts.-Newton has state license to practice medicine as
an Osteopathic Physician, and seeks to enjoin the enforcement
by the Board of a practice barring Osteopathic physicians
from practising in two county hospitals maintained by the
Board. The District Court sustained a general demurrer.
Held.-A physician has no constitutional or statutory
right to practice his profession in a county hospital. The
county board has complete supervision and control. A regu-
lation excluding from the county hospital, or the right to
practice therein, the devotees of some of the numerous sys-
tems or methods of treating diseases authorized to practice
the profession in Colorado, is neither unreasonable or arbi-
trary.
Judgment Affirmed.
PLEADING-ABUSE OF-NEXT FRIEND-NO. 12,281-Ellis v.
Colorado National Bank-Decided October 28, 1929.
Facts.-Plaintiff, who was apparently insane, but has
never been judicially declared to be such was given permis-
sion by the Court below to bring suit by next friend on the
ground that defendants were depriving him of his property
by taking advantage of his mental disorder. Ellis' motions
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were filed in the Court below, and the plaintiff standing on
the complaint, the same was taken. to the Supreme Court,
which sustained the complaint and remanded the cause with
directions to overrule the motions and proceed in harmony
with the opinion. Instead of promptly proceeding with the
discussion of the pleadings and getting the case to issue, vari-
ous motions and demurrers were filed by the defendant. The
Courf below sustained a demurrer on the ground that the
plaintiff could not sue by next friend, but only in person or
by a conservator.
' Held.-Plaintiff not having been judicially declared in-
sane should have been permitted by the Court below in its
discretion to sue by next friend. The repeated reversal of
its rulings by the trial Court after long delays, amounted to
such an abuse of discretion as to defeat the very purpose of
that discretion. All motions and demurrers, if practicable,
should be filed at the same time, and the trial should not be




12441-Wilkinson vs. People-Decided November 4, 1929.
Facts.-Wilkinson was convicted of the crime of rape.
Wilkinson was the step-father of the victim, and his wife,
the mother of the victim, and the victim was a dwarf, twenty-
four years of age with the mentality of a ten-year old child.
Wife of defendant was permitted to testify as to her name,
but was not interrogated further.
Held.-1. Wife is competent to testify against her hus-
band where he is charged with rape against his step-daughter,
who is the real daughter of the wife. 2. The victim was
competent to testify, and whether or not she possessed sufficient
mental capacity to give her legal consent was a question of fact
for the jury. 3. If defendant relies upon improper conduct,
or suggestions by the District Attorney, or others interested in
the prosecution they should immediately be called to the at-
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tention of the trial court, and if not, it is too late to complain in
the Supreme Court.
Judgment Affirmed.
REAL ESTATE BROKER-COMMISSION-No. 12459-Ness vs.
Podd-Decided October 28, 1929.
Facts.-Podd was a licensed real estate broker, and Ness
listed said real estate with him for sale at $2850. The broker
obtained a prospective purchaser who was pleased with the
property, but wanted to get a reduction in price. Two weeks
later, Ness sold the same property through another broker to
the same prospective purchaser for a less price.
Held.-The broker was entitled to his commission for
the sale. The law will not permit one broker who has been
entrusted with the sale of land, and is working with a customer
whom he has found, to be deprived of his commission by
another agent steppling in and selling to the customer for a
price less than the first broker is impowered to receive.
Judgment Affirmed.
SALES-PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-NEGATIVE PREGNANT-No.
12,463-Everett vs. Cole-Decided November 4, 1929.
Facts.-Cole claimed he sold Everett seven hundred
pounds of buffalo bull meat at fifty cents per pound, for which
the latter refused to pay. Defendant claimed he was not a
purchaser, but plaintiff's agent to sell on commission, and
that through no fault of his, nothing was sold; hence, that he
owed nothing. Verdict below for plaintiff for the full
amount. Cole, a member of the bar, accustomed to "throwing
the bull", was the owner of a certain buffalo bull, highly edu-
cated, having attained the degree of B.S., but notwithstanding
this, was wild and fractious which resulted in his summary
execution,* and what was left of the bull, after stripping him
of his honors, was delivered to Everett who hung him up in
his butcher shop, but before any of the meat was sold, it was
*Note: The italics are those of the Editor-in-Chief who admits himself greatly
impressed by this rather novel, yet highly commendable, ground for executing an
attorney.
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condemned by a food inspector who belonged to the "Bull
Moose" party.
Held.-The evidence was competent, material, and rele-
vant, and sufficient to support the verdict for plaintiff. The
instructions fairly state the law. There was no objection taken
to the instructions, but because defendant's counsel had made
objections at a former trial and also at his motion for a new
trial, recited the objections, he claimed that he could assert
the objections here. Rules of the Supreme Court require that
specific objections be made to proposed instructions before
such instructions are given to the jury. No waiver of a failure
to comply with that rule can be binding in the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the answer was a perfect negative pregnant




STRUCTION-No. 12,347-New York Indemnity Company
vs. Industrial Commission and Carl Robinson-Decided
October 14, 1929.
Facts.-Robinson sustained an injury arising out of and
in the course of his employment, which caused the loss of his
right arm near the elbow and a ninety per cent loss of the left
arm. The Commission awarded him compensation for total
and permanent disability. Thereafter Robinson himself ob-
tained employment and the Indemnity Company brought suit
to reduce the award under Sec. 4451 C. L. 1921, which de-
fines total disability as the loss of both hands, etc., except
where the employer or the Commission obtains suitable em-
ployment for the disabled person.
Held.-Robinson having obtained his own employment,




No. 12428-Platt vs. Reynolds-Decided October 28, 1929.
Facts.-Platt was engaged in the automobile business in
DICTA
Denver, and carried Liability Insurance under the Colorado
Workmen's Compensation Act. Reynolds was an employee of
Platt, but resided in Nebraska, and carried on his entire busi-
ness in, Nebraska. He was killed in Nebraska.
Held.-The Colorado Compensation Act does not apply
to one employed by a Colorado Company where the employee
contracts to work in another state and is actually injured in
another state. The Commission could exercise no jurisdiction
over that employment or its conditions. Its protection could




Young lady with several years' stenographic and secretarial experience
in law office, desires permanent position.
Call MISS SWAN, York 5381
